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Free Exercise After the Arab Spring: Protecting Egypt’s
Religious Minorities Under the Country’s New Constitution
JAMES MICHAEL NOSSETT*
I am concerned that respect for religious freedom [in Egypt] is quite
tenuous.
—Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, July 30, 20121
INTRODUCTION
The popular uprisings of the Arab Spring brought a bright hope for greater rights
and freedoms for the inhabitants of the Arab World. With the toppling of
dictatorships and the spread of democracy, peoples that were once oppressed
claimed for themselves the opportunity to live in nations governed by the will of
society, rather than by the dictates of an oppressive regime. One such people was
the nation of Egypt.
On January 25, 2011, Egyptians of all ages began mass demonstrations across
the country in protest of the three-decade dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak,
demanding increased freedom, political change, and social justice.2 The
demonstrations proved successful: seventeen days later, Mubarak resigned and
transitioned governing responsibilities to the Egyptian military,3 which announced
its desires “to permit an elected civil authority to be in charge of the country, [and]
to build a democratic free nation.”4 With democratic elections and the drafting of a
new constitution on the horizon, it seemed that the goals of the revolution were to
be realized, that oppressions common under the Mubarak regime would cease, and
that the longstanding tensions between the nation’s government and its religious
groups—and sectarian strife among the religious groups themselves—would finally
be addressed.
Despite these hopes, the events of the ensuing months brought only deepened
social division and more sectarian strife. With Mubarak gone, long-present tensions

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. This piece is
dedicated to the people of Egypt, that they might worship freely and in peace; to the staff of
the Indiana Law Journal, in recognition of their tireless efforts; to my parents, for their love
and support; and to my beautiful wife, Grace, whom I love most dearly. May grace and
peace be with you all.
1. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Release of the 2011
International Religious Freedom Report, (July 30, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov
/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/07/195782.htm.
2. See infra Part II.B.1.
3. Full Text: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s Resignation Statement, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 11, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/11/full-text-hosni
-mubarak-resignation.
4. Ben Hubbard & Maggie Michael, Egypt Army Commits to Power Transfer, Israel
Peace, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/12
/egypt-govt-officials-banned-traveling-abroad/?page=all#pagebreak (quoting statements
made by Egyptian military leaders).
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between the country’s more conservative Islamist factions (including the Muslim
Brotherhood) on the one hand, and the country’s Coptic minority and liberals on
the other hand, took center stage in the form of disputed elections,5 boycotts of the
constitutional drafting process,6 acts of violence,7 and large-scale protests.8 A new
government—including the first democratically elected leader of the country,
Mohamed Morsi—was elected,9 and a new constitution was drafted and ratified,10
but these measures were not enough to quell the tensions.11 On July 3, 2013, after
days of protests, military forces removed the government from power, suspended
the new constitution, and installed a new transitional government in an effort to
stop the ongoing turmoil.12 On January 14 and 15, 2014, 38.6% of Egyptians turned
out to approve yet another constitution, but proponents of the Morsi government
and Islamist parties boycotted the election, deeming it illegal and illegitimate.13 As
of this writing, protests and political upheaval characterize daily life14 and acts of
sectarian violence continue15—in short, tensions in Egypt remain high.
For a number of reasons, therefore, the coming months are crucial for the future
of Egypt. A stable and legitimate government must be established, and the nation’s
fractured economy must receive attention.16 Yet, more importantly, the coming
months hold the fate of the Arab Spring in Egypt. Will the goals of the
revolution—achieving social justice, increased freedom, and political change—be
achieved, or will conditions of life and of politics in Egypt worsen or, at best,
remain the same as they were in the Mubarak era?
This Note is particularly concerned with the future of religious exercise in
Egypt—that is, the ability of Egyptians to freely exercise their beliefs without
restriction by the state, and without interference by nonstate actors. While certain
adherents of the nation’s dominant religious demographic (Sunni Muslims)17 have

5. See, e.g., Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, 10 Egyptian Presidential Candidates
Disqualified, CNN (Apr. 16, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/14/world/meast
/egypt-elections/.
6. See, e.g., Egypt’s Copts Quit Constitution Drafting Panel, FOX NEWS (Apr. 2,
2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/02/egypts-copts-quit-constitution-drafting
-panel/.
7. See infra Parts II.B.3.b. and II.C.3.b.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.C.1.
10. See infra Part II.C.2.
11. See infra Parts II.C.3 and II.D.
12. See infra Part II.D.1.
13. See Egypt Referendum: ‘98% Back New Constitution,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2014,
2:43 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25796110.
14. See generally infra Part II.D.
15. See infra Part II.D.3.b.
16. “[T]he country is currently running a deficit of 15 percent of GDP, while being kept
afloat only by the inflow of funds from the Gulf countries.” Dalibor Rohac, Egypt’s Subsidy
Nightmare, CATO INST. (Nov. 6, 2013, 9:27 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/egypts-subsidy
-nightmare?utm_content=buffer8365c&utm_source=buffer&utm_medium=twitter&utm
_campaign=Buffer.
17. See infra Part I.A.
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encountered some state-imposed restrictions18 and disruptions in their abilities to
freely practice their faith, adherents of minority religions in Egypt—
Coptic Christians, Baha’is, and others—have long faced both legal and cultural
restrictions on and impediments to their abilities to freely exercise their beliefs.19
Taking the forms of official, state-enforced restrictions on religious exercise, and of
oppression, persecution, and sectarian violence by nonstate actors, Egypt’s
religious minorities have endured decades of limitations on their abilities to
practice their respective faiths. Now, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Egypt has
a prime opportunity to address such restrictions through the adoption of strong and
enforceable rights of free exercise in the nation’s new constitution.
Therefore, this Note examines the plight of religious minorities in Egypt before,
during, and after the Arab Spring—that is, under the Mubarak regime, during the
January 25 Revolution and the Morsi government, and into the future—and
proposes a number of constitutional design features that the framers of Egypt’s new
legal system should adopt in order to enable these groups to more freely exercise
their beliefs without abuse from state and nonstate actors. The Note begins in Part I
with a brief overview of Egypt’s religious demographics and cultural conceptions
of identity and religious exercise. In Part II, this Note examines the treatment of
Egyptian religious minorities by both state and nonstate actors (A) under the
Mubarak regime, (B) in the immediate aftermath of the January 25 Revolution,
(C) under the Morsi government, and (D) in the immediate aftermath of the
June 30 Revolution until the time of this writing. This Note then concludes Part II
with an analysis of the future of Egypt’s religious minorities as it appears at the
time of this writing, identifying a number of concerns regarding their abilities to
exercise their beliefs.
Finally, in Part III, this Note argues that Egypt must enshrine religious liberty and
free exercise in the nation’s new Constitution through guaranteed individual rights
and effective enforcement mechanisms to implement such rights against both state
and nonstate actors. This Part argues that the framers of Egypt’s governing system
under its new Constitution should, at the very least, engage in the following steps:
(A) explicitly adopt the Supreme Constitutional Court’s 1996 interpretation of
Article 46 of the 1971 Constitution as the state’s official interpretation of similar
language in the country’s new Constitution; (B) ensure the creation and continuance
of institutional structures to incentivize accountability and enforcement of religious
freedom guarantees; (C) ensure that its horizontal rights provisions protecting
freedom of belief and religious practice are enforced; and (D) ensure the
enforcement in domestic courts of international human rights conventions to which
it has agreed. Additionally, though it would be more difficult to implement than the

18. Notably, they have faced a ban on religiously based political parties, see Dina
Guirguis, Stability or Rigidity? Egypt’s Use of Constitutional and Executive Power, WASH.
INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL’Y (Nov. 16, 2010), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy
-analysis/view/stability-or-rigidity-egypts-use-of-constitutional-and-executive-power,
and
more recently, certain of their political groups—most notably, the Muslim Brotherhood—
have been banned and declared to be terrorist organizations, see Egypt Declares Muslim
Brotherhood a Terrorist Group, FOX NEWS (Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world
/2013/12/25/egypt-declares-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-group/.
19. See infra Part II.A.2.
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above steps, this Part further argues that Egypt’s leaders should (E) remove
restrictive language from constitutional provisions that guarantee religious freedom.
I. RELIGION AND THE CULTURE OF EGYPT
The challenges that Egypt’s minority religions face are the products of the
nation’s religious demographics and cultural heritage. Therefore, to more fully
understand the treatment both past and present of Egypt’s religious minorities, one
must first understand the country’s composition and grasp its concepts of identity
and religious exercise.
A. Religious Demographics
Both ethnically and religiously, the population of Egypt is very homogenous.
Egypt’s 85.3 million residents are nearly all ethnic Egyptians (99.6% of the
population), and 90% are Sunni Muslims.20 The remaining 10% of Egyptians
belong mostly to religions accepted and recognized by Islamic and government
authorities (the “heavenly religions” of Christianity and Judaism),21 though a small
percentage of Egyptians belong to religions that the state does not officially accept
or recognize (most notably Baha’is and Shi’a Muslims).22
Of the recognized religions, the largest minority religion is Christianity, most of
whose adherents are Copts.23 The Copts are an Egyptian Orthodox sect of
Christianity that traces its origin back to the time of the apostles and has its own
patriarch (the “Coptic Pope”).24 A much smaller percentage of Christians in Egypt
belong to numerous other Christian denominations.25 In addition, a very small
number of Jews still live in Egypt.26
Non-Abrahamic religious minorities are only minimally present in Egypt.27
Members of the Baha’i faith have been in Egypt since 1910,28 numbering 5000 at

20. CIA, Egypt, in WORLD FACTBOOK (2014), available at https://www.cia.gov/library
/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html.
21. Islam officially recognizes only the “heavenly” or “divine” or “Abrahamic”
religions that pre-existed Islam—Judaism and Christianity. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUM. RTS. & LABOR, EGYPT 2012 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE 4 [hereinafter 2012 BUREAU REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf
/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=208386#wrapper; Samuel Tadros, Heritage
Foundation, Religious Freedom in Egypt, BACKGROUNDER NO. 2487, Nov. 9, 2012, at 5.
22. 2012 BUREAU REPORT, supra note 21, at 4.
23. See id.
24. See Scott Kent Brown II, Comment, The Coptic Church in Egypt: A Comment on
Protecting Religious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1049,
1051–53.
25. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 2; CIA, supra note 20.
26. Approximately 120 Jews still live in Egypt. Tadros, supra note 21, at 2. Note, in the
early 1900s, Egypt’s Jewish population numbered roughly 80,000. David Kenner, What
Happened to the Jews of Egypt?, PASSPORT: FOREIGN POL’Y L. BLOG (Mar. 27, 2013, 7:43
AM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/27/what_happened_to_the_jews_of_egypt.
27. See Ahl al-Kitab, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (2013), available at http://www.britannica.com
/EBchecked/topic/10067/Ahl-al-Kitab; Tadros, supra note 21, at 2–4.
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their peak in the middle of the twentieth century;29 while only a small number of
Baha’i followers (roughly 2000) are in Egypt today, they have prominently
featured in disputes over religious freedom over the past two decades.30
Additionally, a small number of non-Sunni Muslims—including roughly 300
Shi’a—live in Egypt today, but are unrecognized due to their beliefs.31 Further, a
handful of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Latter Day Saints currently reside in Egypt.32
B. Identity and Religious Exercise in Egypt
The treatment of religious minorities today is due in large part to the ways that
Egyptians conceive both their national identity and religious exercise. During the
sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire ruled Egypt and
administered it such that “[e]ach religious group was [its own nation,] given
autonomy in its own affairs.”33 This practice caused each group to be “viewed as
both alien and constituting a collective identity,” and created a situation in which
“new religious groups were viewed with suspicion as they deviated and broke away
from the organized and recognized sects.”34 Coupled with the dominance of Islam
in the country,35 this practice has allowed group identities to so permeate Egyptian
culture that the country has maintained internal divisions along religious lines.
Surprisingly, out of this divided culture grew an Egyptian nationalism rooted in
a common, Egyptian identity—one that proved strong enough to weaken and
eventually overthrow British colonial authorities in the early-twentieth century.36
Unsurprisingly, however, with internal upheaval over the last several decades and
the twin tides of Pan-Arabism37 and Islamism38 that swept the region during the
same period, the internal fractures in Egyptian culture have become more
pronounced, undermining the “Egyptian” identity that once held the various
religious cultures together.39
Religious practice in Egypt, in turn, is colored both by this concept of group
identity and by the dominance of Islam in the country. As Samuel Tadros aptly
28. See Johanna Pink, A Post-Qur’ānic Religion Between Apostasy and Public Order:
Egyptian Muftis and Courts on the Legal Status of the Bahā’ī Faith, 10 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y
409, 410 (2003).
29. Id. at 412.
30. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 2, 12.
31. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
REPORT FOR 2010, at 229 [hereinafter 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.uscirf.gov/sites
/default/files/resources/annual%20report%202010.pdf.
32. The U.S. State Department estimates that there are between 800 and 1200 Jehovah’s
Witnesses in Egypt, but they are unrecognized due to a 1960 presidential decree. See id. at
234.
33. Tadros, supra note 21, at 2.
34. Id.
35. See Brown, supra note 24, at 1051; see also supra Part I.A.
36. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 2.
37. See generally ELIE PODEH, THE DECLINE OF ARAB UNITY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (1999).
38. See, e.g., ARE KNUDSEN, POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1 (2003), available
at http://www.cmi.no/publications/2003/rep/r2003-3.pdf.
39. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 2.
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stated in a 2010 Heritage Foundation study, “[t]he basic Egyptian understanding of
religious freedom is limited, often understood as simply freedom to worship, albeit
under significant constraints. An understanding of religious freedom as the right of
all faiths to bring religiously based values to the public square is virtually
nonexistent.”40 In a 1994 interview, the Mubarak regime’s Minister of Religious
Affairs, Muhammed Ali Mahjub, noted that “[f]reedom in Islam means
commitment and good behavior, not chaos and disunity,” and that “any attempt to
slander religion”—a term that has been interpreted quite broadly41—“is a call to
dismember the homeland and cannot be termed freedom of expression.”42 As such,
freedom of religious exercise in Egypt is a limited concept, protecting belief itself
but not the expression of that belief—particularly if that belief conflicts with the
beliefs of others. Accordingly, the guarantees of religious exercise that Egypt has
created have heretofore been subject to narrow application.43
II. MINORITY RELIGIOUS EXERCISE IN EGYPT’S PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
The story of minority religious exercise in Egypt’s past and present is one of
uncertainty and inconsistency. Rights of religious exercise have always been
included in the Egyptian governing structure, at least in some form; yet, minority
religions have still encountered many restrictions pertaining to their abilities to
exercise their respective faiths—both explicit restrictions and practical ones—
imposed by both state and nonstate actors. This Part traces the treatment of
religious minorities from the years under Mubarak (Subpart A), during the
January 25 Revolution and its immediate aftermath (Subpart B), under the Morsi
government (Subpart C), and from the June 30 Revolution to the time of this
writing (Subpart D), showing that state and nonstate actors have continued to
impede these religious groups in the exercise of their respective faiths in the
months since the January 25 Revolution.
A. Religious Exercise Under Mubarak
The Mubarak regime’s policies regarding religious exercise both for religious
minorities and for the Islamic majority were inconsistent—at times benevolent, at
times harsh, and at times ambivalent. Provisions protecting religious exercise
existed in the regime’s Constitution, but state enforcement of these rights often did
not occur. Likewise, the state imposed restrictive regulations on religious exercise,
interfered with and persecuted religious groups (both majority and minority), and
did little to stop nonstate acts of violence against religious minorities.

40. Id. at 3.
41. See Parts II.A.2.a, II.B.3.a, and II.C.3.a.
42. Interview by Pedro C. Moreno, Int’l Coordinator of the Rutherford Inst., with
Muhammed Ali Mahjub, Minister of Religious Affairs (Awkaf) in Egypt (Sept. 10, 1994), as
reprinted in HANDBOOK ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD 264 (Pedro C. Moreno
ed., 1996).
43. See infra Part II.A.
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1. Provisions Under Mubarak
The Constitution under the Mubarak regime44 was established in 1971 and
featured a number of broadly worded clauses protecting religious liberty and
religious exercise; however, it also established Islam as the state religion and the
source of law.45 Article 40 guaranteed equality “before the law . . . without
discrimination . . . due to . . . religion or creed.”46 Additionally, Article 46 provided
that “[t]he State shall guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of
religious rites,”47 which Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) interpreted in
the following manner: “No one may be compelled to believe in a religion which
[one] denies; to declare the religion to which [one] adheres; to withdraw from the
[religion one] has chosen, or to favor a particular religion in prejudice to another,
either by way of contempt, defamation or renunciation.”48 Article 2, however,
established Islam both as the state’s official religion and as the foundation of its
legal code, thereby allowing legislative implementation of Islamic principles.49
Though the SCC limited the application of the amended form of this Article to laws
passed after the Article was amended,50 this establishment of religion colored the
implementation of religious exercise provisions such as Articles 40 and 46 in
practicality, especially for minority religions.
2. Religious Exercise Limitations and Abuses
Despite Egypt’s constitutional protections, religious minorities have faced
restrictions on the exercise of their beliefs, both from state and nonstate actors.

44. For a concise summary of Egypt’s former regime and its leader, Hosni Mubarak, see
Profile: Hosni Mubarak, BBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/world-middle-east-12301713.
45. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971, as amended,
May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 2.
46. Id. art. 40.
47. Id. art. 46.
48. Case no. 8/17/Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt), as quoted in TAMIR
MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 166 (2007). An alternative translation reads as follows: “an
individual is not to be compelled to accept a creed that he does not share or renounce a creed
that he has entered into or that he has proclaimed. One creed should not be discriminated
against in favor of others through denunciation, contempt or disdain.” Nathan J. Brown &
Clark B. Lombardi, The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and
Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8
of Judicial Year 17 (May 18, 1996), 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 437, 457 (2006).
49. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971, as amended,
May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 2; Tamir Moustafa, The Islamist Trend in
Egyptian Law, 3 POL. & RELIGION 610, 610 (2010).
50. See Moustafa, supra note 49, at 619–20.
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a. State Actors
Though the state is obligated to protect minority religious exercise, the
authoritarian regimes of the past several decades51 have allowed, enabled, and even
authorized a number of significant restrictions on religious expression by minority
religions. Through regulatory measures, the Egyptian government made it very
difficult for minority religions (both recognized and unrecognized) to build, alter,
or rebuild their houses of worship, and the government made it effectively
impossible for converts to minority religions or believers in unrecognized faiths to
practice their faith in the country.
Restrictions on the building and maintenance of non-Muslim houses of worship
are perhaps some of the most obvious and practical state restrictions on minority
religious exercise. Since 1856, the state has required that non-Muslims get the
permission of the ruler (which, between 1962 and 2005, was interpreted to mean
the Egyptian President52 or the governors) prior to receiving a permit to build or
renovate their religious spaces.53 This requirement has proven more than
meddlesome, as the state proved reluctant and slow to grant permission and, even if
it did, it proved even more reluctant to allow the building or renovation to
continue.54 Most seriously, this requirement heavily restricted Coptic efforts to
reconstruct houses of worship damaged or destroyed by terrorism and sectarian
violence.55 Where religious minorities built or modified their structures without
permission, security forces sealed the structures’ doors with wax.56
Similarly, previous regimes impeded minority religious exercise by requiring
that citizens place their religious affiliation on their national ID cards,57 while only
certain religions were officially recognized by the state.58 Therefore, members of
minority religions not recognized by the state—Jehovah’s Witnesses, Latter-Day
Saints, minority Muslim groups, and Baha’is—were prevented from having

51. The Nasser Regime (1956–70); the Sadat Regime (1970–81); and the
Mubarak Regime (1981–2011). See Egypt Profile: Timeline, BBC (Feb. 26, 2014, 7:53 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13315719.
52. See HANDBOOK ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 42.
53. See 2010 REPORT, supra note 31, at 232. One report noted a priest’s complaint that
he could not “even paint without the permission of Hosni Mubarak.” See HANDBOOK ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 42, at 267 (quoting Virginia N. Sherry,
The Predicament of Egypt’s Christian Minority, 110 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 717, 717 (1993)).
54. From 1998 to summer 2009, only “67 permits for new churches were approved and
2,475 existing churches were granted permission to expand or make repairs,” and “even in
cases where approval . . . ha[d] been granted, . . . local security services prevent[ed]
construction or repair, in some cases for many years.” 2010 REPORT, supra note 31, at 232.
Thus, “the approval process . . . is [a] time-consuming and inflexible” barrier to minority
free exercise. Id.
55. See id.
56. HANDBOOK ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 42, at 272. For
perspective, “[d]uring the first five months of 1992, the government issued only two permits
and closed more than seven ‘illegally constructed’ churches in the Cairo area alone.” Id.
57. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROHIBITED IDENTITIES 14 (2007), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt1107webwcover.pdf.
58. Id.; supra Parts I.A–B.
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national ID cards and, thus, from obtaining birth certificates, enrolling in schools,
or securely holding employment.59 Members of minority religious groups without
these national ID cards were effectively prohibited from living, learning, and
working in Egypt.60 Although a recent SCC ruling allowed Baha’is to have the
religious identification section of their national ID cards left blank, not all Baha’i
applicants received such cards.61 And, because “Egyptian courts have held that
Muslims may not change their identity papers to reflect conversion,” converts to
minority religions were further impeded and practically discouraged from changing
their religious beliefs.62
Further, the Mubarak regime restricted minority religious exercise rights by
interfering with their activities—including, in some instances, persecuting them
through police action—and failing to protect them from acts of violence by
nonstate actors.
Whether for political purposes or in accordance with Islamic law, the Mubarak
regime and its predecessors actively interfered with and persecuted religious
minorities. Presidential decrees heavily restricted or banned various minority
religions.63 The government also enforced Shari’a prohibitions of apostasy and
proselytization through article 98f of the Penal Code64 and the Emergency Laws in
order “to detain—and subsequently, often maltreat or even torture—Muslims
accused of apostasy.”65 Further instances of state persecution of religious

59. Tadros, supra note 21, at 12.
60. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 14.
61. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 11–12.
62. HANDBOOK ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 42, at 268.
63. For instance, in 1960, President Nasser banned the members of the Baha’i faith by
“revoking the community’s corporate status and confiscating [their] properties.” HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 18. A similar 1960 decree banned “all Jehovah’s
Witnesses activities.” U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT FOR 2013, at 56 [hereinafter 2013 REPORT], available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/2013%20USCIRF%20Annual%20Report
%20%282%29.pdf. Similarly, in response to sweeping sectarian violence in 1981, President
Sadat banished Coptic Pope Shenouda III and arrested hundreds of Copts. Brown, supra note
24, at 1062.
64. Article 98f prohibits the use of religion to “ignite strife, degrade any of the heavenly
religions or harm national unity or social peace.” Maurits S. Berger, Apostasy and Public
Policy in Contemporary Egypt: An Evaluation of Recent Cases from Egypt’s Highest Courts,
25 HUM RTS. Q. 720, 722 n.4 (2003).
65. Id. Religious conversion in Islam is a one-way street: minority religions are allowed
to convert to Islam, but Muslims may not convert to minority religions unless they formerly
belonged to that minority religion—and then only with great difficulty. See Tadros, supra
note 21, at 10 (“Even in these rare instances, the Interior Ministry has refused to issue
[minority ex-converts] new ID cards.”); Thomas Najjar, Democracy Under Islam: Rejection,
Adoption, or Containment?, 6 REGENT J. INT’L L. 419, 428 (2008). According to Shari’a,
“Muslims who convert are considered legally dead,” they “lose their property to the state,”
and their marriages “are dissolved.” HANDBOOK ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE
WORLD, supra note 42, at 269.
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minorities66 include unexplained detentions,67 detentions for acts of religious
expression,68 and torture or physical abuse during detention.69
Previous regimes also facilitated the persecution of religious minorities
indirectly by failing to enforce protective provisions,70 by responding inadequately
to religious violence,71 and by ineffectively preparing to deal with religious
violence altogether.72 Time and again, the state “dealt” with nonstate acts of
violence against religious minorities by withholding punishment and hosting
“reconciliation sessions” for all parties to play nice and get along,73 or by meting
out punishment haphazardly and arresting members of the victim minority
religion.74 Egyptian security forces, on several occasions, were accused of
“‘allowing Islamic extremists to commit acts of anti-Christian violence with their
complete knowledge, sometimes even when they had advance warnings.’”75 One
such instance was “the Al-Kosheh violence in January of 2000, where . . . security
forces failed to implement any preventive plans between the initial confrontations
between Copts and Muslims and the bloody massacre two days later.”76
b. Nonstate Actors
Facilitated by such inaction by the state, the “most radical” restrictions on
minority religious exercise in Egypt came from acts of violence perpetrated by
fellow residents of Egypt.77 Nonstate, sectarian violence in Egypt has been
extremely deadly and unfortunately commonplace.78 While a detailed account of
the violence among religious groups is beyond the scope of this Note, in general
terms, nonstate acts of violence have caused the deaths of thousands of Egyptians
(most of them belonging to religious minority groups) over the last several
decades.79 Facilitated by state inaction, nonstate, sectarian violence proved to be a
major impediment to minority religious exercise in Egypt.

66. See generally, e.g., 2010 REPORT, supra note 31.
67. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 56–57.
68. See id. at 57–58.
69. See id. at 56–58.
70. See 2010 REPORT, supra note 31, at 230.
71. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, 2009 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices: Egypt, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt
/2009/nea/136067.htm.
72. See, e.g., 2010 REPORT, supra note 31, at 230 (noting advocacy group concerns that
“Egyptian authorities’ repeated characterization of [a 2008 attack on the Abu Fana monastery
by armed Muslim Bedouins] as a ‘land dispute’ [though ownership of the land was disputed]
ignores the severity of violence faced by Coptic Orthodox Christians”).
73. See 2012 BUREAU REPORT, supra note 21, at 7.
74. See Brown, supra note 24, at 1062.
75. Id. at 1071 (quoting Bob Hepburn, Egypt’s Christians Harbor Deep Fears, TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 19, 1993, at A10).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1069.
78. See generally, e.g., 2012 BUREAU REPORT, supra note 21.
79. For example, from 1990–1994, 1164 Egyptians were killed as a result of nonstate acts
of violence motivated in large part by religion. Brown, supra note 24, at 1070. For a detailed
account and analysis, see generally, for example, 2012 BUREAU REPORT, supra note 21.
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B. Religious Exercise During the Arab Spring
As was the case in many countries across the Arab World in 2011, the citizens
of Egypt rose up in protest against the existing regime and brought about its
downfall, ushering in the hope of a sweeping increase in civil and political rights.80
While the revolution brought some relief, many of the existing abuses, failures, and
restrictions on minority religious exercise remained.
1. Tahrir Square and Beyond
The events of the January 25 Revolution were bathed from beginning to end in
the rhetoric of protest for greater rights. Weeks earlier, following the lead of the
Tunisians, thousands of Egyptians across the nation rose up in mass protests against
the Mubarak regime, beginning on January 25, 2011, most notably in Cairo’s
Tahrir Square.81 Their reasons were clear: “We are telling President Mubarak to
go . . . . The Egyptian people no longer want this system. [Mubarak has] closed all
doors to peaceful change.”82 “In the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez,” Amr
Hamzawy reported, “the only slogans heard demanded change, freedom, social
justice and a stop to corruption.”83 On February 11, 2011, after two-and-a-half
weeks of largely peaceful protests, Mubarak announced that he would be stepping
down from the Egyptian Presidency and handing power over to the military.84
Announcing its intention to govern until free elections could be held,85 the
governing Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) “dissolved the parliament,
suspended the constitution, formed a committee to recommend constitutional
amendments, and called for presidential and parliamentary elections.”86 Later, it

80. For an excellent summary of the major events of the Arab Spring in Egypt and the
context of the revolution, see Garry Blight, Sheila Pulham & Paul Torpey, Arab Spring: An
Interactive Timeline of Middle East Protests, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012, 10:45 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive
-timeline.
81. See Thousands Protest Across Egypt, Inspired by Tunisia, NPR (Jan. 25, 2011,
10:25 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/01/25/133208321/thousands-protest-across-egypt
-inspired-by-tunisia (providing an audio recording and transcript of a discussion between
host Steve Inskeep and reporter Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson).
82. Egypt: Thousands Protest Against President Hosni Mubarak—Video, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/jan/25/egypt-protest-president
-murabak-video.
83. Amr Hamzawy, Egypt: Day of Anger Suggests a New Protest Scene Driven by
Youth, Free of Ideology, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011, 1:15 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes
.com/babylonbeyond/2011/01/egypt-day-of-anger-suggests-a-new-protest-scene-driven-by
-youth-free-of-ideology.html.
84. Chris McGreal & Jack Shenker, Hosni Mubarak Resigns—and Egypt Celebrates a
New Dawn, GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2011, 2:43 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb
/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo.
85. Chris McGreal, Egypt’s Military Rejects Swift Transfer of Power and Suspends
Constitution, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011
/feb/13/egypt-military-rejects-swift-power-handover.
86. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
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“issued a 63-article constitutional declaration to govern the country through the
transition[,] and issued laws governing the formation of political parties and the
structure of parliamentary elections.”87
2. Developments Concerning Religious Exercise During
the Revolution’s Immediate Aftermath
The SCAF took a number of steps affecting minority religions when it took over
managerial control of Egypt: first, as mentioned above, it suspended and replaced
the 1971 Constitution with a new but temporary Constitutional Declaration; second,
it repealed or attempted to repeal certain statutory provisions in an effort to make
minority religious exercise rights more effective; and third, it made efforts to
protect religious minorities from acts of nonstate violence.
Although the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration altered the structure of
government, it largely retained the status quo regarding religion: Islam remained
the state’s religion and Shari’a remained prominent in the legal culture, but the
rights of all were (at least nominally) protected. Article 2 of the document was
identical to the same Article in the 1971 Constitution.88 Article 6 of the document
guaranteed the equal protection of laws and equality of rights and duties, and it
protected against discrimination “due to . . . religion, or creed.”89 Article 11
guaranteed “freedom of creed, and practicing religious rites.”90
The SCAF acted on behalf of religious minorities by amending provisions of the
various codes to prohibit discrimination on religious grounds. Further, the SCAF
amended the Penal Code to “prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion . . . [or]
faith” and “delineated prison sentences and specific fines for discriminatory acts, as
well as [for] failure to prevent discrimination[, including] more severe penalties for
government officials found to be complicit in discrimination.”91 Additionally, the
SCAF attempted to amend the requirement that non-Muslim religious organizations
get permission from the government for constructing or maintaining houses of
worship and replaced it with requirements that would apply to all religions.92
However, due to discontent on the part of “Muslims, Christians, and Egyptian
human rights groups” with the text of the proposal, the amended law was
withdrawn.93
Finally, the SCAF made some efforts to protect religious minorities from
nonstate acts of violence. For example, the SCAF and the Interior Ministry
successfully protected celebrations of Coptic Christmas during the 2011–2012
REPORT FOR 2012, at 51 [hereinafter 2012 REPORT], available at http://www.uscirf.gov/sites
/default/files/resources/Annual%20Report%20of%20USCIRF%202012%282%29.pdf.
87. Id.
88. See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Mar. 23,
2011, art. 2 [hereinafter MARCH 2011 CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION].
89. Id. art. 6.
90. Id. art. 11.
91. 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 61.
92. Id. at 58.
93. Id. According to the 2012 report, “some reports have indicated that [an
unpublicized, subsequent version of the] draft law covers only churches and not other places
of worship.” Id.
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holiday season, such that they “passed without incident.”94 Additionally, on
October 15, 2011, the SCAF gave bite to the new Article 6 by amending the Penal
Code to ban religious discrimination (among other forms of discrimination), and
established prison terms and fines for violations of antidiscrimination provisions.95
3. Limitations of Religious Exercise and Abuses During
the Revolution’s Immediate Aftermath
Despite the above steps taken by the SCAF, the revolution and its immediate
aftermath did not improve the status of minority religious exercise in Egypt.
Rather, impediments and persecutions both official (by the state) and practical (by
nonstate actors) continued.
a. State Actors
The SCAF continued to allow and even to perpetrate a number of significant
restrictions on the religious expression of minority religions through both
obstructive regulations and the facilitation of persecution.
Regulations impeding minority religious exercise continued as before.96 Despite
SCAF efforts to amend, the requirement that minority religions have governmental
approval for building or remodeling their houses of worship remained.97 Though
reconverts to Christianity were allowed to display their true religious identity
without indicating their former conversion from Islam on their national ID cards,
due to a July 3, 2011, court decision, restrictions on Baha’is and other minority
religious groups regarding their ID cards remained.98 Likewise, the SCAF
continued the government’s policy of not recognizing certain minority religions,
and the antiproselytization and apostasy prohibitions remained.99
SCAF authorities continued to interfere with and persecute religious minorities,
thereby both directly (through government harassment and attacks) and indirectly
(through failure to protect religious minorities against sectarian violence) impeding
their abilities to exercise their respective faiths. For example, on October 9, 2011,
security forces violently dispersed a group of Copts who were protesting for the
rebuilding of a church that had been demolished by extremists.100 The security
forces opened fire on the protestors and killed twelve by running them over with
military vehicles.101 Likewise, the SCAF continued to allow unrecognized minority
religions to be arrested and harassed by police forces: “[i]n December 2011, at least
four Shi’a Muslims reportedly were detained and charged with ‘insulting and

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 61.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 58.
Id.
See id.
CAIRO INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES, FRACTURED WALLS . . . NEW
HORIZONS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ARAB REGION, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, 102 [hereinafter
NEW HORIZONS]. This incident became known as the “Maspero Massacre.” Id.
101. Id.
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denying tenets’ of Islam,” and “[i]n January 2012, Egyptian authorities closed the
Shi’a Hussein mosque in Cairo to prevent Shi’a Muslims from observing
Ashura.”102
SCAF authorities indirectly facilitated the persecution of religious minorities by
failing to protect religious minorities from acts of violence perpetrated by nonstate
actors, and by failing to adequately punish perpetrators of such acts, thereby
passively allowing the destruction of Coptic churches and other acts of sectarian
violence.103 For example, on May 7–8, 2011, security forces assigned to protect the
Virgin Mary Church in Imbaba abandoned their post when militants arrived, and
despite “several indications that groups of Muslims would attempt to attack other
churches in the area, . . . [security forces did not] deploy[] . . . around other
churches in the area.”104 The SCAF also continued the use of “reconciliation
sessions”105 to try to ease sectarian tensions, and did not always seek out and
punish the perpetrators of such actions.106
b. Nonstate Actors
Sectarian violence continued to be the most significant impediment to minority
religious exercise during this period. According to a report by Voice of America,
“[i]n 2011, approximately 94 people—mostly Coptic Christians—died as the result
of sectarian violence in Egypt, 70 [after] the fall of Mubarak.”107 With the upheaval
of the government and the rise of Islamist groups, nonstate actors had further
opportunity and greater strength with which to effectively reduce minority
religions’ exercise abilities to little significance. In 2011, extremists attacked a
number of historic Sufi mosques in Alexandria,108 set fire to homes of Baha’is in
the Sohag province,109 demolished the Two Martyrs Church in Cairo and then later
interfered with its reconstruction,110 and “attempted to storm” (and successfully
closed) the Mar Mina Church in Imbaba (leaving 15 dead and 242 wounded).111 In
addition to these acts of violence, “[s]ome Islamist militant groups” took advantage
of overburdened security forces and began “to impose extra-judicial
punishments.”112

102. 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 53.
103. See NEW HORIZONS, supra note 100, at 100.
104. EIPR Releases Findings of Field Investigation into Imbaba Events, EGYPTIAN
INITIATIVE FOR PERS. RTS. (May 14, 2011), http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2011/05/14/1166.
105. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
106. See 2012 BUREAU REPORT, supra note 21, at 9.
107. Editorial, Protect Religious Freedom in Egypt, VOICE OF AM. (Aug. 5, 2012),
http://editorials.voa.gov/content/protect-religious-freedom-in-egypt--165201506
/1493362.html.
108. 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 54.
109. Id. at 59.
110. “The SCAF promised to rebuild the church, but it was not possible to begin
reconstruction until religious leaders were brought in to convince local Muslims to permit
it . . . .” NEW HORIZONS, supra note 100, at 101.
111. Id.
112. 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 54.
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In sum, during the revolution’s immediate aftermath, religious minorities found
themselves in much the same position as under the Mubarak regime. Though
efforts were made by the SCAF to reduce restrictions on minority religious
exercise, many of these efforts proved insufficient. The practical impediments of
restrictive state regulations, state facilitation of persecution, and nonstate
persecution and acts of violence all combined to leave the exercise abilities of
religious minorities still far short of those guaranteed by its governing documents.
C. Under the Morsi Government
Over a span encompassing November 2011 to June 2012, Egyptians elected a
new government113 consisting of a new president and a parliament charged with
commissioning a panel to design Egypt’s next constitution. The Islamist-dominated
government, the provisions regarding religion and religious exercise in the new
Constitution, and the further oppression of and tension with minority religious
groups by state and nonstate actors yet again prevented many positive
developments in terms of religious exercise. Instead, the status quo—regulations
and sectarian violence—remained, and the ratification of a new Constitution laid
the foundation for greater restrictions on minority religious exercise.
1. The Morsi Government
The new Egyptian government was elected under the oversight of the SCAF
during the beginning months of 2012 and brought with it a wave of new, largely
Islamist, leaders.114 The 498-seat People’s Assembly (the lower house of
parliament) was elected between November 2011 and January 2012, with the
Freedom and Justice Party (affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood) winning 47%
of the seats, and the Al-Nour Party (affiliated with the Salafis) winning 24% of the
seats.115
In March 2012, the newly elected parliament appointed a 100-member
constitutional design panel—the Constituent Assembly—to draft the nation’s next
constitution.116 Given the Islamist majority in the lower house of parliament,
two-thirds of the panel’s members were Islamists, while only 6% of the panel’s
seats were held by members of a minority religious group (the Copts).117 The small

113. Though President Mohamed Morsi was not elected until June 2012, long after the
People’s Assembly was elected in the late months of 2011 and the early months of 2012, I
hereinafter term this government the “Morsi government” or the “Morsi regime” for
purposes of reference.
114. Under the Mubarak regime, political parties were forbidden to have any sort of
religious affiliation; under the SCAF regime, however, this prohibition was scrapped (or at
least not enforced). 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 54.
115. Id. at 51.
116. See Tamim Elyan, Egyptian MPs Pick Constitution-Setting Assembly, REUTERS
(Mar. 24, 2012, 11:59 PM), available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/24/uk-egypt
-constitution-idUKBRE82N0CR20120324.
117. See id.; Egypt’s FJP Denies Power Monopoly, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Mar. 27, 2012,
10:32 AM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/03/27/Egypts-FJP-denies-power
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number of liberals and minority members on the panel walked out of an early panel
meeting in protest, and on April 10, 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court
suspended the panel because it was unrepresentative of the population.118 In early
June 2012, parliament appointed a new Constituent Assembly that consisted of
fewer members of parliament—meaning fewer guaranteed seats to Islamists—and
guaranteed a few seats for appointment by the Coptic Church.119
In the months after the appointment of the new panel, however, four significant
developments took place regarding the fate of religious minorities. First, the
Islamists won the presidency—the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice
Party’s Mohamed Morsi was narrowly elected in June 2012—but lost the lower
house of parliament, which the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved,
citing concerns over the method of election for seats that constitutionally should
have been reserved for independent candidates.120 To date, Egypt continues to
function without a lower house of parliament.121 Second, the judicial branch was
subjected to a number of challenges both from President Morsi and from the people
of Egypt: in July 2012, Morsi called the parliament back into session in defiance of
the SCC (the SCAF and courts prevented enforcement of this decree);122 in
November 2012, Morsi excluded himself from judicial review (large protests and
the passage of the constitutional draft ultimately caused Morsi to rescind this
decree);123 and on December 2, 2012, Islamist protestors at the SCC led the court to
-monopoly/UPI-40251332858733/.
118. Egypt’s Supreme Administrative Court Suspends Embattled Constituent Assembly,
AHRAM ONLINE (Apr. 10, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/38936/Egypt
/Politics-/Egypts-Supreme-Administrative-Court-suspends-embat.aspx;
Egypt
Court
Suspends Constitutional Assembly, BBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2012, 10:16 AM), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17665048.
119. Egypt Parties End Deadlock over Constitutional Panel, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2012,
2:49 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18360403.
120. See Egypt Supreme Court Calls for Parliament to Be Dissolved, BBC NEWS (June
14, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18439530 (quoting
Farouk Soltan, President of the SCC). Parliamentary elections were slated to occur between
April and June 2013, but were again put on hold by an Egyptian court in February 2013,
which held that the bill providing for the election conditions was unconstitutional. See Zaid
Al-Ali & Nathan J. Brown, Egypt’s Constitution Swings into Action, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar.
27, 2013), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/27/egypt_s_constitution_swings
_into_action. The SCC will be taking up the question at an undetermined date, meaning that
Egypt will continue to function without a parliament indefinitely. See David D. Kirkpatrick,
Egypt Court Cancels Parliamentary Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2013, at A8, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/world/middleeast/egypt-court-cancels-parliamentary
-elections.html.
121. See Timeline: Three Years of Egypt’s Political Procedures, AHRAM ONLINE (Mar.
18, 2014), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/96993/Egypt/Politics-/TIMELINE
-Three-years-of-Egypts-political-procedure.aspx.
122. Steve Hendrix & Ernesto Londoño, Egypt’s Morsi Moves to Reinstate Parliament,
WASH. POST, July 9, 2012, at A2, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07
-08/world/35488975_1_morsi-islamists-supreme-constitutional-court.
123. David D. Kirkpatrick & Mayy El Sheikh, Citing Deadlock, Egypt’s Leader Seizes
New Power and Plans Mubarak Retrial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012, at A4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/world/middleeast/egypts-president-morsi-gives-himself
-new-powers.html?ref=middleeast.

2014]

FREE EXERCISE AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

1669

suspend operations until the end of the month.124 Third, the Constituent Assembly
approved the new Constitution on November 29, 2012, over the objections of
human rights groups and minority members of the Constituent Assembly (for
reasons discussed below),125 and the people of Egypt ratified the document on
December 25, 2012.126 Fourth, the populace grew even angrier: protests against
decisions of the government continued regularly, with the heightened violence
leading Morsi in one instance to declare a state of emergency in three major
cities.127
2. Developments Concerning Religious Exercise Under the Morsi Government
During the Morsi regime, a number of significant changes occurred. As the 2013
USCIRF Report discusses, “several positive societal developments
[occurred] . . . .”128 Among these, the report notes, were the following:
•

“Christian communities . . . [began] to organize with both opposition
groups and representatives from Al-Azhar to counter religious
extremism.”129

•

“[M]any Christian churches [began urging] community members to be
active in the democratic transition of a new Egypt.”130

•

“In February 2013, Christian groups came together to form for the first
time ever an Egyptian Council of Churches.”131

•

“[M]any diverse interlocutors expressed positive views of the moderating
role Al-Azhar has played since the January 2011 revolution”—a role that
has included “spearhead[ing] initiatives[,] . . . publish[ing] statements

124. Stephanie McCrummen, Egyptian Judges Suspend Work as Morsi’s Backers Swarm
Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2012, at A1, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012
-12-02/world/35586015_1_morsi-high-court-islamists; Ramadan Al Sherbini, Top Court
Resumes Work After Unprecedented Suspension, GULF NEWS (Dec. 30, 2012, 7:00 PM),
http://gulfnews.com/news/region/egypt/top-court-resumes-work-after-unprecedented
-suspension-1.1125728.
125. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Egyptian Islamists Approve Draft Constitution Despite
Objections, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11
/30/world/middleeast/panel-drafting-egypts-constitution-prepares-quick-vote.html. The draft
was hurriedly passed due to the political pressure created by Morsi’s attempted power grab
in late November 2012 and the looming challenge before the SCC to the constitutionality of
the Constituent Assembly. Id.
126. Abigail Hauslohner & Ingy Hassieb, Egypt Ratifies Islamist-Backed Constitution,
WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-25/world
/36016130_1_islamists-new-charter-opposition-groups.
127. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Morsi Declares Emergency Rule in 3 Egypt Cities,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/world
/middleeast/morsi-declares-emergency-in-3-egypt-cities-as-unrest-spreads.html.
128. 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 48.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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expressing support for freedom of religion or belief in Egypt,” and
engaging in “interfaith dialogue initiatives[] aimed at unifying the various
religious communities and countering extreme Islamist views.”132
•

“[T]he government began to re-open more than 50 existing churches that
had been closed, in some cases for years.”133

Perhaps the most significant development, however, was the adoption of a new
Constitution.134 A number of that document’s clauses had implications for minority
religious exercise, and some of them—if given force and applied even-handedly to
all religions in Egypt—could have provided great protections for minority religious
exercise. However, such clauses (1) included language that either (a) has existed in
Egypt’s previous constitutions yet proven ineffective, or (b) was limited to only
recognized religions, and (2) were surrounded by other articles that threatened to
create a more hardline, Islamist regime.
The following provisions in the new Constitution constructed a framework
allowing for minority religions to exercise their faith:
•

Article 31 provided that “[d]ignity is the right of every human being,
safeguarded by the State” and that “[i]nsulting or showing contempt
toward any human being shall be prohibited.”135

•

Article 43 provided that “[f]reedom of belief is an inviolable right” and
further clarified this provision by stating that “[t]he State shall guarantee
the freedom to practice religious rites and to establish places of worship
for the divine religions, as regulated by law.”136

•

Article 3 provided that “[t]he canon principles of Egyptian Christians and
Jews are the main source of legislation for their personal status laws,
religious affairs, and the selection of their spiritual leaders.”137

•

Article 8 provided that “[t]he State guarantees the means to achieve
justice, equality and freedom, and is committed . . . to ensur[ing] the
protection of persons and property . . . within the context of the law.” 138

•

Article 9 provided that “[t]he State shall ensure safety, security and equal
opportunities for all citizens without discrimination.”139

However, two factors colored the implementation of the above provisions:
first, the language of the Articles; and second, the fact that the Constitution
expanded Islam’s role as the state’s official religion and the foundation of its legal
culture.
Regarding the first, the text of several articles raised the following concerns:

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 29 Nov. 2012.
Id. art. 31.
Id. art. 43.
Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 8.
Id. art. 9.
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•

Article 43’s guarantee of public religious exercise (through the
establishment of houses of worship) was limited in application to the
heavenly religions (accepted branches of Islam, Christianity, and
Judaism), thereby excluding followers of other religions from its
protections.140 Furthermore, the Article’s protections of religious exercise
“[were] limited to ‘rites’ and places of worship,” to the exclusion of other
forms of religious expression.141

•

“[Article 31] [was] a double-edged sword,” Ahmed Aboul Enein stated.
“Although it state[d] [that] human dignity is a right and that the state and
society have to respect it, it also stipulate[d] [that], ‘under no circumstance
may a citizen be insulted or disrespected.’”142 This, he continued, “[could
have been] interpreted to . . . limit[] freedom of speech or even [have] lead
to imprisonment, in the ilk of contempt of religion laws.”143

•

Article 3’s grant that adherents of the heavenly religions may be subject to
the principles of their own laws was limited to certain areas of the law;
further, the Article’s grant was only for those few, specific religions.144 As
such, it legally segregated society into religious factions, officially
dividing society into religious groups rather than creating one legal code
acceptable and applicable to all, thus opening the door for sectarian strife.

Regarding the second, the new Constitution further solidified both Islam’s status
in the government145 and the state’s role in protecting the morals and values of
Egyptians.
•

Article 4 endowed the state-supported university in Cairo—Al-Azhar—
with authority over matters of Shari’a law, to be consulted by the
government in matters of Shari’a interpretation.146

•

Article 44 prohibited the “insult or abuse of all religious messengers and
prophets”147—a prohibition for which Egyptian officials interviewed for
the 2013 report “were unequivocal in their support . . . stating that there

140. See id. art. 37; see also Ahmed Aboul Enein, Analysis of Constitutional Draft—Part
2, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Oct. 17, 2012), http://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/10/17/analysis-of
-constitutional-draft/. According to the 2013 report, “government officials stated that Article
43 guarantees religious freedom for all Egyptian citizens, including Baha’is. However, some
officials felt that Baha’is would need to test this freedom in court,” because the Constitution
does not include reference to their faith. 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 50.
141. 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 50.
142. Enein, supra note 140.
143. Id.
144. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 29 Nov. 2012, art. 3.
145. See id. art. 2.
146. See id. art 4.
147. Id. art. 44. An earlier version of the Article also protected “the divine being . . . the
mothers of the faithful and the rightly guided caliphs.” Egypt: Fix Draft Constitution to
Protect Key Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/08
/egypt-fix-draft-constitution-protect-key-rights.
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are consequences for insulting or injuring the religious feelings of
others.”148
•

Article 2’s language remained the same as in previous constitutions,149 but
Article 219 explained what the “principles of Islamic Sharia” referenced in
Article 2 were to include: “general evidence, foundational rules, rules of
jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the
larger community.”150

•

Article 10 stated that the “family is the basis of the society and is founded
on religion, morality and patriotism”; accordingly, the Article gave the
state and society the duty of preserving the “genuine character of the
Egyptian family . . . and [] protect[ing] its moral values.”151

•

Article 11 gave the state the role of “safeguard[ing] ethics, public morality
and public order, and foster[ing] a high level of . . . religious . . .
values.”152

In sum, while a number of positive societal developments regarding religious
freedom took place under the Morsi regime, the new Constitution—while
recognizing and protecting minority religions—formally expanded the role of Islam
in the state and, in turn, the role of the state in society, thus raising many
concerns.153
3. Limitations of Religious Exercise and Abuses Under the Morsi Government
As discussed above, there were several positive developments under the Morsi
government. As the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s Annual
Report for 2013 details, the “newly elected government[] . . . made some
improvements related to freedom of religion or belief[,] . . . there was positive
social progress between religious communities[,]” and there was “a significant
decrease in the number of fatalities and injuries from sectarian violence.”154
However, state and nonstate restrictions, persecutions, and impediments to
religious exercise persisted.
a. State Actors
The Morsi government continued to allow and to perpetrate many of the same
failures as did the Mubarak regime and the transitional government. The regime
actively restricted minority religious exercise by continuing to delay compliance
with the SCC’s ruling that granted identity cards to Baha’is155 and continuing to

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
As the

2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 50.
See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 29 Nov. 2012, art. 2.
Id. art. 219.
Id. art. 10.
Id. art. 11.
See, e.g., Hauslohner & Hassieb, supra note 126.
See 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 47.
See id. For discussion of this issue, see supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
2013 report notes, “Baha’is who are married still cannot get identity cards,” but
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make difficult the process of reflecting one’s religious conversion on identity
documents.156 The requirement of government approval for construction or repair
of religious facilities remained, and significantly, “[n]o churches were approved for
new construction or repair in 2012, despite applications being submitted to
governors.”157 The regime continued to restrict unrecognized religions—for
example, the regime restricted meetings of Jehovah’s Witnesses to groups of thirty
and in private homes,158 and publicly declared that Baha’i children “do not have the
right to register in government schools . . . [because] [t]he state only recognizes
three religions.”159 Further, state “courts continued to prosecute, convict, and
imprison Egyptian citizens charged with ‘contempt’ or ‘defamation’ of religion.”160
The following prosecutions are exemplary:
•

July 2012: A Shi’i teacher “was sentenced to one year in prison . . . for
contempt of religion and ‘desecration of a place of worship,’ although
[his] lawyer says he was found guilty solely for praying in a mosque
according to Shi’i rituals.”161

•

September 2012: A court affirmed a three-year prison sentence for a
Coptic teacher for a Facebook post of “cartoons defaming the Prophet
Muhammad.”162

•

November 2012: A court sentenced seven expatriate Copts to death for
“harming national unity, insulting and publicly attacking Islam, and
spreading false information,” allegedly for being “associated with the
‘Innocence of Muslims’ online film.”163

•

December 2012: A court sentenced atheist Alber Saber to three years in
prison for “posting . . . online content that allegedly ‘insulted God and cast
doubt on the books of the Abrahamic religions’ and ‘denied the existence
of God and his creation of mankind.”164

The Morsi government also maintained the passive posture of former regimes in
its response to sectarian violence. Specifically, the government often “failed or was
slow to protect religious minorities from violence,”165 and often “fail[ed] to convict

“[u]nmarried Baha’is can put a dash on ID cards in the space for religion.” 2013 REPORT,
supra note 63, at 56.
156. See 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 47, 55 (“During USCIRF’s 2013 visit, several
interlocutors explained that despite a July 2011 law making it easier to reflect one’s religion
on ID cards . . . it still is difficult in practice to obtain identity cards.”).
157. Id. at 54.
158. Id. at 56.
159. Bahais Cannot Enroll in Public Schools, Education Minister Says, EGYPT INDEP.
(Jun. 6, 2013, 8:51 PM), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/bahais-cannot-enroll
-public-schools-education-minister-says.
160. 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 47.
161. Id. at 52.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 47. See also Egypt: Address Recurring Sectarian Violence, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/10/egypt-address-recurring-sectarian
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those responsible for the violence”166 or convicted instead only adherents of one
religion but not another,167 thereby “continu[ing] to foster a climate of impunity.”168
Some Egyptian officials even denied that the violence had anything to do with
sectarian divides, claiming that “violence experienced by Copts was not a sectarian
problem . . . but one that affects all Egyptians”—a fact that “Egyptian human rights
groups and Christian activists refute.”169
Most concerning, however, is where the Morsi government exceeded its
forbearers: by providing a bolstered constitutional framework for further restricting
minority religious exercise. The Articles of the new Constitution170 “affirm[ed] the
[continued] criminalization of ‘defamation of religion.’”171 They legally divided
society along religious lines. They placed “Al-Azhar scholars [in] a consultative
role in reviewing religiously-significant legislation.”172 And, most significantly for
religious exercise purposes, the Articles protected only limited forms of religious
expression—“rites” and “places of worship”—and this only for recognized
religions.173 Thus, the new Constitution made many of the aforementioned
restrictions on religious exercise constitutional matters, rather than merely statutory
or social ones as they had been previously, thereby adding further challenges for
minority religions to overcome.
b. Nonstate Actors
Though the body count dropped “significantly” under the Morsi regime,174
practical restrictions on minority religious exercise by nonstate actors persisted.
Incitements to violence against religious minorities continued, of which the
following are illustrative:
•

February 2012: An Alexandrian Salafi leader announced on a television
program that “Baha’is should be prosecuted for treason because they are
apostates and are not entitled to any rights in Egypt.”175

•

September 2012: After publication of the Innocence of Muslims film on
the Internet, “Islamist clerics and some Gulf-funded satellite television
stations used the film as an opportunity to denounce and demonize Coptic

-violence.
166. 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 58.
167. See id. at 53–54 (“[I]n 2012, in May, an emergency state security court in Minya
sentenced 12 Christians to life in prison. The court also acquitted eight Muslim defendants.
The case arose from clashes . . . in April 2011 . . . [that] left two Muslims dead, scores of
Christian shops and homes burned, and several . . . wounded.” Note, however, “in December
2012, the verdict was annulled,” and a new trial was commenced.).
168. Id. at 53.
169. Id.
170. See supra Part II.C.2.
171. 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 50.
172. Id.
173. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 29 Nov. 2012, art. 43.
174. See 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 53.
175. Id.
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Christians, including a prominent Salafi cleric who publicly defiled and
ripped a Bible.”176
Acts of sectarian violence also continued, of which the following three attacks
are most noteworthy:
•

August 2012: An incident that began as “a dispute between a Christian and
Muslim at a dry-cleaning business after the Muslim man’s shirt was
accidentally burned,” ended in one death, several injuries, the destruction
of several Coptic homes and businesses, and the flight of “nearly all of the
Christian families” in the area for fear of reprisals.177

•

April 2013: One Muslim and five Christians were killed, and buildings
and shops were set on fire, in violence in the town of Khosus.178 Though
the cause of that incident is disputed,179 witnesses reported that, during the
violence, the cleric of the local mosque “call[ed] out from the
loudspeaker[,] ‘Kill all the infidels,’” and “ask[ed] everyone to take their
weapons and attack the church.”180

•

June 2013: What began as a gathering of twenty-four Shia residents of the
town of Abu Musallim in a private home turned into a riotous conflict,
with “a crowd of over 1,000 people gather[ing]” outside the house,
“hurling stones and Molotov cocktails into the house.”181 When four of the
Shia residents exited the house, “[t]he crowd attacked, beat, stabbed and
lynched the four men,” and “[v]ideo footage show[ed] their bloodied
lifeless bodies being kicked on the ground and then dragged through the
streets.”182

In sum, under the Morsi regime, religious minorities found themselves in much
the same position as before. Though positive developments occurred and the death
toll of sectarian violence dropped, many acts of sectarian violence still occurred.
Many of the same restrictions on minority religious exercise, both official and
practical, remained. And the enactment of the new Constitution not only threatened
to make former restrictions matters of constitutional concern, but also created new
impediments to minority religious exercise.

176. Id. at 52.
177. Id. at 53.
178. Egypt: Address Recurring Sectarian Violence, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/10/egypt-address-recurring-sectarian-violence.
179. See id. (One news agency stated that “Muslim residents became outraged after
people they believed to be Christian children sprayed a swastika onto the wall of a religious
institute affiliated to Al Azhar,” while “[s]ome local residents claim that a fight between
Christian children playing soccer and a Muslim man and his sister escalated after their
families became involved.”).
180. Id.
181. Egypt: Lynching of Shia Follows Months of Hate Speech, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June
27, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/27/egypt-lynching-shia-follows-months-hate
-speech.
182. Id.
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D. The June 30 Revolution and Its Immediate Aftermath
As it would turn out, the Morsi regime proved to be short lived. Over the second
half of 2013, the government fell, the military installed a transitional government,
and constitutional amendments were proposed. Yet, while the constitutional
developments would allay some fears stemming from the 2012 Constitution’s
original language, many of the same restrictions, persecutions, and acts of sectarian
violence would continue.
1. The Return to Tahrir
After repeated allegations of ineptitude, as well as opposition concerns over the
regime’s policies and its creation of an increasingly Islamist government,183
Egyptians throughout the country rose up in protest on June 30, 2013, to demand
Morsi’s resignation.184 Large, pro-Morsi counterprotests ensued,185 and on that
same day, the Egyptian military gave Morsi a forty-eight-hour deadline to “meet
the demands of the people”186 before it would intervene to restore order187 and
impose its own “road map” out of the crisis.188 Morsi openly defied the military’s
ultimatum and, with gun battles across the country between pro- and antigovernment factions ensuing, set the stage for a dramatic confrontation with the
military.189 On July 3, the military made good on its ultimatum by removing Morsi
from power and suspending the Constitution.190
The military did much to reshape the political landscape in Egypt, but not
without great cost. After removing Morsi, the military installed a senior judge of

183. See Patrick Kingsley, Protesters Across Egypt Call for Mohamed Morsi to Go,
GUARDIAN (June 30, 2013, 5:55 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/30
/mohamed-morsi-egypt-protests, in which the leader of one opposition party claimed that
Morsi had “hijacked [the] revolution,” and in which another protestor stated that though
“Morsi got elected in a democratic way, . . . since he took over, everything’s been polarised[,
and a]ll of a sudden, we see ourselves part of an Islamic regime like Iran.”
184. Id. As Kingsley notes, for example, approximately 500,000 protestors filled Cairo’s
Tahrir Square, and 100,000 protestors filled Alexandria’s city center. Id.
185. See, e.g., Manar Mohsen, A Day with Pro-Morsi Protestors: “We Are Not Scared of
Tomorrow,” DAILY NEWS EGYPT (June 30, 2013), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06
/30/a-day-with-pro-morsi-protesters-we-are-not-scared-of-tomorrow/.
186. As reported in Salma Abdelaziz, Rza Sayah & Ben Wedeman, Egypt’s Military
Gives Morsy Ultimatum, CNN.COM (July 2, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07
/01/world/meast/egypt-protests/.
187. Id.
188. David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Egyptian Military Gives Ultimatum to
Morsi, Whose Allies See ‘Coup,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2013, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/egypt-protests.html?_r=0.
189. See Martin Chulov & Patrick Kingsley, Egypt: President Morsi Defiant as Army
Deadline Runs Out, GUARDIAN (July 3, 2013, 4:42 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2013/jul/03/egypt-morsi-army-deadline-expires.
190. Abigail Hauslohner, William Booth & Sharaf al-Hourani, Egyptian Military Ousts
Morsi, Suspends Constitution, WASH. POST (July 3, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com
/2013-07-03/world/40336012_1_president-mohamed-morsi-wednesday-night-morsi-rally.
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the SCC as interim president and declared that while “‘peaceful protests’ could
continue, . . . [it] would respond with ‘strength and determination’ to any outbreaks
of violence.”191 Over the following weeks and months the military systematically
disbanded,192 and the transitional government banned outright,193 the Muslim
Brotherhood; violently dispersed pro-Morsi demonstrations;194 and arrested
former-President Morsi195 and placed him on trial for “inciting the murder of
protestors demonstrating outside Cairo’s presidential palace [in] December
[2012].”196
Despite its bloody crackdown on Islamists and supporters of the former regime,
the military once again set Egypt on a path to democracy—albeit a version of
democracy in which the military would play a significant role. On July 6, 2013, the
military issued a constitutional declaration, which established a process for
amending the suspended 2012 Constitution.197 On January 14 and 15, 2014,
Egyptians approved yet another Constitution by an overwhelming margin (98.1%
of voters), but turnout was only 38.6% of the electorate as supporters of the Morsi

191. Id.
192. Specifically, leaders of the Brotherhood have been detained and imprisoned. See,
e.g., Reuters, Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood Leader Mohammed Badie Reportedly Detained,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2013, 8:22 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20
/egypt-badie-muslim-brotherhood-detained.
193. Maggie Michael, Egypt Bans Muslim Brotherhood, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23,
2013,
4:06
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/23/egypt-bans-muslim
-brotherhood_n_3974979.html.
194. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Killing of Islamists Deepens
Crisis in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013
/07/09/world/middleeast/egypt.html; David D. Kirkpatrick, Hundreds of Egyptians Killed in
Government Raids, Emergency Declared as Sectarian Violence Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
15, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/world/middleeast/egypt
.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0; Death Toll from Egypt Violence Rises to 638: Health Ministry,
AHRAM ONLINE (Aug. 15, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79160
/Egypt/Politics-/Death-toll-from-Egypt-violence-rises-to--Health-mi.aspx (noting that the
death toll from one day’s violence was 638, while the injury count from the same day’s
violence was 3994).
195. Patrick Kingsley, Egypt on High Alert as Mohamed Morsi Trial Threatens to Revive
Civil Unrest, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2013, 6:25 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013
/nov/03/egypt-high-alert-mohamed-morsi-trial.
196. Id.
197. CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 6 July 2013, arts.
28–30 [hereinafter JULY 2013 CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION], translated at
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/15/full-text-of-the-july-2013-egyptian
-constitutional-declaration. Note, the fifty-member committee responsible for drafting
constitutional amendments was to be comprised of representatives of “all categories of
society and demographic diversities especially parties, intellectuals, workers, peasants,
members of trade unions and qualitative unions, national councils, Al Azhar, churches, the
Armed Forces, the Police[,] and public figures including ten members from the youth and
women at least.” Id. art. 29 (emphasis added). Notably, few Islamists were selected to the
committee. See Egypt Referendum on Constitution ‘Set for January,’ BBC (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25089456.
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government and Islamist groups boycotted the election.198 In March 2014,
Egyptian’s Interim President, Aldy Mansour, announced that presidential elections
would be held by mid-summer 2014,199 with parliamentary elections to follow
thereafter.200 Thus, Egypt entered yet another transitional phase—another chance to
lay a foundation for social justice and increased freedoms.
2. Developments Concerning Religious Exercise
Under the Transitional Government
Under the transitional government, “freedom of belief and the freedom to
practice religious rites” were guaranteed in the interim by the July 2013
constitutional declaration.201 But the most significant, long-lasting, and potentially
positive development for religious minorities was the passage of an amended
Constitution that rolled back much of the religious language of the document it
replaced and, as of this writing, appears to establish a foundation for greater
religious exercise.
Though retaining Article 2 and repeating that the “principles of Islamic Sharia
are the principal source of legislation,” 202 the amended Constitution removed much
of the religious language present in the 2012 Constitution. Specifically, the
amended Constitution did the following:
•

Removed language in what formerly was Article 4 (and renumbered the
amended language as Article 7), which required the government to consult
with Al-Azhar on matters of Shari’a interpretation.203

•

Amended the language of Article 10 to say that “[t]he state protects [the
family’s] cohesion and stability, and the consolidation of its values.”204

•

Deleted Article 11, which gave the state the role of “safeguard[ing] ethics,
public morality and public order, and foster[ing] a high level of . . .
religious . . . values.”205

198. See Egypt Referendum: ‘98% Back New Constitution,’ supra note 13.
199. See Egypt’s Presidential Elections Commission Issues Regulations for Upcoming
Polls, AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 17, 2014), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/96923
/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Presidential-Elections-Commission-issues-re.aspx.
200. See Marie-Louise Gumuchian & Yousuf Basil, Egypt to Have Presidential Elections
First, CNN (Jan. 26, 2014, 2:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/26/world/africa/egypt
-violence/.
201. JULY 2013 CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, art. 7, supra note 197.
202. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, pmbl.
203. Compare CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 7, with
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 4.
204. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 10. Compare id.,
with CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 10 (giving the state
and society the duty to preserve the character of the family and protect moral values).
205. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 11. Compare
id., with CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014 (containing no such
provision).
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•

Amended the language of Article 43 (and renumbered it as Article 64) to
say that freedom of belief is “absolute.”206

•

Deleted Article 44, which prohibited the “[i]nsult or abuse of all religious
messengers and prophets.”207

•

Replaced Article 219, which explained what the “principles of Islamic
Sharia” were to include, with a sentence in the preamble stating that the
rulings of the Supreme Constitutional Court were instead to be the
“reference for the interpretation of such principles.” 208

Additionally, the amended Constitution included a number of new provisions
recognizing and seeking to protect minority religious groups. The following
provisions are most noteworthy:
•

The Preamble notes that the “Constitution . . . holds all of us equal in
rights and duties without discrimination of any kind,”209 and Article 53
states that “[a]ll citizens are equal before the Law . . . in rights, freedoms
and general duties, without discrimination based on religion [or] belief,”
and that “[d]iscrimination and incitement of hatred is a crime punishable
by Law,” and charges the state to “take all necessary measures for
eliminating all forms of discrimination” and to create “an independent
commission for this purpose.”210

•

Articles 47 and 50 charge the state to “maintain the Egyptian cultural
identity with its diversified branches of civilization,”211 noting that
“Egypt’s civilization and cultural heritage, whether physical or moral,
including all diversities and principal milestones—namely Ancient
Egyptian, Coptic, and Islamic—is a national and human wealth,” and that
“[t]he State shall pay special attention to protecting components of cultural
pluralism in Egypt.”212

•

Article 93 states that “[t]he State shall be bound by the international
human rights agreements, covenants and conventions ratified by Egypt,
and [these] shall have the force of law after publication in accordance with
the prescribed conditions.”213

•

Article 99 states that “[a]ny violation of personal freedom, or the sanctity
of the private life of citizens, or any other public rights and freedoms
which are guaranteed by the Constitution and the Law is a crime,” grants

206. Compare CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 64,
with CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 43.
207. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 44. Compare
id., with CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014 (containing no such
provision).
208. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 219. Compare
id., with CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, pmbl.
209. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, pmbl.
210. Id. art. 53.
211. Id. art. 47.
212. Id. art. 50 (emphasis added).
213. Id. art. 93.
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that “[t]he affected party shall have the right to bring a direct criminal
action,” provides that “[t]he State shall guarantee fair compensation for
the victims of such violations,” and allows the National Council for
Human Rights to “file a complaint with the Public Prosecution of any
violation of these rights” and to “intervene in the civil lawsuit in favor of
the affected party at its request.”214
•

Article 214 requires that “[t]he law shall specify the independent national
councils, including the National Council for Human Rights,” and that
“[t]he law shall state the composition, mandates, and guarantees for the
independence and neutrality of [its] respective members.” It also grants
the council “the right to report to the competent authorities any violations
pertaining to [its] field[] of work” and its own “legal personality,” and
requires it to be “consulted with respect to the bills and regulations
pertaining to [its] affairs and field[] of work.”215

•

Articles 235 and 244—specifically addressing Christians—require the
state in its first legislative term to “issue a law to regulate constructing and
renovating churches, in a manner that guarantees the freedom to practice
religious rituals for Christians,”216 and in its first election to “endeavor that
. . . Christians . . . be appropriately represented in the first House of
Representatives.”217

•

Article 224 requires that “[t]he state shall be obliged to issue laws
executing the provisions of this Constitution.”218

While these amended provisions do a number of things to protect religious
minorities—ensure equality before the law, make discrimination a crime, create
commissions to eliminate discrimination, celebrate and protect cultural diversity,
recognize international human rights agreements, provide a criminal cause of action
for violation of Constitutional rights, empower a human rights council to intervene
on behalf of victims of such violations, guarantee compensation to victims of such
violations, provide for the construction of churches, require Christians to be
adequately represented in the parliament, and require the state to execute provisions
of the Constitution—many of the same problems that religious minorities face
remain unaddressed in the Constitution. Religious exercise is limited to the
practicing of religious rites and to the establishment of places of worship, and these
liberties are only accorded to followers of the three heavenly religions.219 And the
provision directing the state to regulate the construction and renovation of houses
of worship is limited to Christian churches only.220 However, these amended
provisions do establish a sturdier framework for the exercise of minority religious
rights than did the 2012 Constitution.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. art. 99.
Id. art. 214.
Id. art. 235.
Id. art. 244.
Id. art. 224.
See id. art. 64.
See id. art. 235.
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3. Limitations of Religious Exercise and Abuses
Under the Transitional Government
Despite the constitutional developments discussed above, state and nonstate
restrictions on minority religious exercise continue as before.
a. State Actors
Former state restrictions on minority religious exercise—identity card issues,
recognition only of certain religions, requirements for permission for the building
or repair of houses of worship, etc.221—persist. Additionally, and most egregiously,
the state has continued its failure to adequately protect against or to effectively
address acts of sectarian violence. According to Human Rights Watch, “[i]n the
vast majority of the 42 cases” of sectarian violence that they documented
throughout July and August 2013, “neither the police nor the military were present
at the start or during the attack[s],”222 despite the fact that, “‘[f]or weeks, everyone
could see these attacks coming.’”223 “Church clergy throughout Upper Egypt,” the
report continued, “expressed frustration and desperation that security services did
not quickly intervene to stop the widespread attacks.”224 As one Coptic bishop
stated, “‘[Church officials] spoke to the prime minister, minister of interior, and a
military official asking them to intervene,’ . . . [and they] promised to send
protection, but it never arrived.”225 As a Coptic priest surmised, “The government
let us burn, so they could show the world the Brotherhood burning us.”226
Yet, the situation remains unchanged. As a police officer in Luxor told Human
Rights Watch, security forces have failed to act because they simply do not know
what to do: “Put yourself in my position, and ask yourself two questions. First, do
you fire live fire[, and on whom]? Who will be killed . . . ? Second, . . . [w]hat do
you do if you don’t get an order that will allow you to take more action?”227
Luxor’s security director, Major Khalid Mamdouh, went so far as to tell Human
Rights Watch that “it’s not [the police’s] job to stop killings, we just investigate
afterward.”228 Therefore, despite the crackdown by security forces on political

221. See supra Part II.C.3.a. Note that even though Article 235 directs the new
government to pass a law regulating the building and renovation of churches—an act which
the transitional government could not accomplish to the satisfaction of all parties in 2011,
see supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text—this provision is limited only to Christian
churches and still involves the state’s regulatory hand in the practice of a minority religion.
See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 235.
222. Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/21/egypt-mass-attacks-churches.
223. Id. (quoting Joe Stork, the “acting Middle East director at Human Rights Watch”).
224. Id. For a detailed account of the failure of security forces to act, see id.
225. Id. (quoting Anba Makarios, the Coptic Bishop General of Minya).
226. Laura King, Attack on Wedding Is Latest Horror for Egypt’s Coptic Christians,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/21/world/la-fg-egypt
-church-shooting-20131022 (quoting Father Maximum Nemr).
227. Egypt: Sectarian Attacks Amid Political Crisis, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 23, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/23/egypt-sectarian-attacks-amid-political-crisis.
228. Id.
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violence, security forces either remain unwilling to intervene in acts of sectarian
violence or, as this officer described, are paralyzed as to how to respond to such
violence.
b. Nonstate Actors
After the June 30 Revolution, sectarian violence escalated dramatically—
particularly violence against Coptic Christians, whom many Islamists blamed for
the downfall of the Morsi government.229 Human Rights Watch reported that,
between July 3 and July 23, “at least six attacks on Christians [took] place . . .
across Egypt.”230 In one such attack, Morsi supporters “looted and burned St.
George’s Coptic Catholic church and al-Saleh church in the village of Delga,”
injuring eight.231 In another, Morsi supporters “attacked St. Mary’s church, set fire
to a security booth outside the church, and attacked a police station there.”232
The most widespread violence, however, occurred between August 14 and 21,
when “attackers . . . torched and looted scores of churches and Christian property
across the country.”233 In one case in the city of Minya, attackers burned the Anba
Moussa church and a Christian orphanage, and painted red and black Xs on shops
in the area to distinguish between Muslim- and Christian-owned stores234—stores
marked as Christian-owned then were attacked.235 Per several accounts, many of

229. See Jeffrey Fleishman, Christian-Muslim Animosity Becomes Incendiary Subplot in
Egypt, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/20/world/la-fg
-egypt-sectarian-20130820. It is worth mentioning that “the Coptic pope, Tawadros II,
appeared alongside army chief Abdel Fattah Sisi on nationwide television on July 3 to
announce that Morsi had been removed from office.” King, supra note 226.
230. Egypt: Sectarian Attacks Amid Political Crisis, supra note 227.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches, supra note 222. Human Rights Watch compiled
the following list of burned, damaged, or attacked churches: Abu Sifin Church; Abu Teeg
Bishopric; Adventist Church; Al-Amir Tadros al-Shatbi Church; Al-Amir Tadros Church,
Fayum; Al-Amir Tadros Coptic Church; Al-Anba Mousa Church; Al-Malak Church;
Al-Mallak Church; Al-Mashyakhiya Evangelical Church; al-Qowsiyya Bishopric and
Chruch; Al-Rasuliya Apostolic Church; Al-Rasuliyya Church; Al-Shaheeda Damyana
Church; Al-Younaniyya al-Qadeema Church; Baptist Church; Evangelical Church, Asyut;
Evangelical Church, Fayum; Evangelical Church, Minya; Evangelical Church, Minya – Bani
Mazar; Franciscan Catholic Church and School; Franciscan Church and School, Asyut;
Franciscan Church and School, Suez; Good Shepherd Catholic Church and School, Minya;
Good Shepherd Catholic Church and School, Suez; Karmet al-Rosul Church; Mar Gergas
Coptic Church; Mar Gerges Church; Mar Gerges Church Services Building; Mar Meena
Church; Mar Meena Coptic Church; Mar Yohanna Church; Nahdet al-Qadasa Church; Saints
Mary and Ibram Coptic Church; Saviour’s Anglican Church; St. George Coptic Church and
Diocesan Office; St. George Hadayeq Church; St. Mary Church, Fayum – al-Manala; St.
Mary Church, Fayum; St. Mary Church, Giza – Deir Hakim; St. Mary Church, Giza –
al-Mansouriya; St. Therese Church. Id.
234. Alexander Dziadosz, Egypt’s Political Strife Puts Christians in Peril, ASWAT
MASRIYA (Aug. 21, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://en.aswatmasriya.com/analysis/view.aspx?id
=91bed416-cdef-4d77-a570-fb250f992685.
235. See Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches, supra note 222.
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these attacks were by Islamists directly in response to the June 30 Revolution: for
instance, those who burnt down the St. George Coptic Church in Sohag and the
Saints Mary and Ibram Church in Delga chanted “Islamic, Islamic” while storming
the churches—a chant that, according to Human Rights Watch, is common to
“proponents of an Islamic state.”236 As one man standing guard outside the St.
George’s Church in Helwan stated, “The Muslim Brotherhood wants to burn down
the country.”237 He noted, however, the very different posture of his non-Islamist
Muslim neighbors: “[t]he Muslims in this neighborhood brought [cookies]” to the
guards and “came to protect the church.”238
Attacks continued throughout the remainder of 2013, with one notable instance
occurring in Cairo in mid-October. At the Church of the Virgin Mary, churchgoers
were attending a series of weddings in the church when gunmen opened fire, killing
four—one of whom was the eight-year-old niece of one of the brides that
evening—and wounding nineteen.239
E. Summing up the Situation: The Problems that Remain
In sum, the situation for religious minorities in Egypt has improved little over
the course of the January 25 and June 30 Revolutions. The main restrictions on
religious exercise, both official and practical, remain: Baha’is and other
non-heavenly religions are still not recognized by the state;240 proselytization is still
forbidden;241 apostasy (leaving Islam) is still prohibited;242 religious identity is still
required on national ID forms;243 and minorities still require government
permission for building or modifying their houses of worship.244 The state
continues to limit minority religious exercise through the above methods and to
facilitate the persecution of minorities through its persistent failure to adequately
deal with and prevent antiminority violence,245 and nonstate actors continue their
attacks on minority religious groups.246
Adherents of minority religions in Egypt face two challenges in the aftermath of
the Arab Spring: first, their government has repeatedly demonstrated a lack of
accountability in protecting their property, religious exercise, and lives;247 and
second, they are surrounded by an armed and angry populace that, already prone to
deadly acts of sectarian violence,248 is now more religiously charged than in the

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Fleishman, supra note 229.
Id.
King, supra note 226.
See 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 47, 55–56.
See 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 58.
See id. at 59.
See, e.g., id. at 59–60.
See id. at 58.
See supra Part II.D.3.a.
See supra Part II.D.3.b.
See supra Parts II.A.2.a, II.B.3.a, II.C.3.a.
See supra Part II.A.2.b.
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past, given the prominent role that Islamists have played in the recent political
instability.
Therefore, restrictions on minority religious exercise in Egypt could very well
increase in the aftermath of the revolution—at the very least, from a practical
standpoint in terms of sectarian violence—making the situation of Egypt’s religious
minorities worse under the new democracy than they were under the regimes prior
to the Arab Spring.
III. PROTECTING MINORITY RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
In light of this potential, Egypt must act to reverse the tide of restrictions and
abuses of religious exercise for its minorities. And the best way it can do so is this:
to enshrine religious liberty and free exercise in the nation’s foundational
document—its new, amended Constitution—through guaranteed rights and
effective enforcement mechanisms that implement such rights against both state
and nonstate actors.249 Many of the new Constitution’s provisions create a
foundation upon which Egypt’s new leaders can build structural mechanisms to
protect minority religious exercise, and many provisions explicitly protect such
minority religions.250 However, if not acted upon, these provisions will be only
aspirational sentiments—mere text, not protections. Accordingly, Egypt should
engage in the following steps:
A. Adopt the SCC’s interpretation of Article 46 of the 1971 Constitution as
governing the application of Article 64 of the new Constitution;251
B. Ensure the creation and continuance of institutional structures to
incentivize accountability and enforcement of religious freedom
guarantees;
C. Ensure that the Constitution’s horizontal rights provisions protecting
freedom of belief and religious practice are enforced;
D. Ensure the enforcement in domestic courts of international human rights
conventions to which it has agreed; and
E. Remove the restrictive language from constitutional provisions that
guarantee religious freedom.

249. Constitutional provisions that include minority religions in the structure of
government could certainly help the situation, but given the overwhelming dominance of
Muslims in Egypt (90% of the population), such provisions are not likely to bring about
significant change—the same tensions and pressures will remain. See supra Part I.A.
Ultimately, therefore, effective rights are needed for protection from state and nonstate
actors, and these will prove ineffective without a stable government and security force
dedicated to the rule of law.
250. See supra Part II.D.2.
251. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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A. Adopt the SCC’s Expansive Interpretation of Freedom of Religious Practice
Egypt should explicitly adopt the SCC’s 1996 interpretation of Article 46 of the
1971 Constitution as the governing interpretation of the similar provision in the
new constitution—Article 64.252 In Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, the Court
determined that the guarantee of “freedom of belief and . . . of practice of religious
rights” in then-Article 46 prevented compulsion to “believe in,” to “declare,” to
“withdraw from,” or to “favor . . . by way of contempt, defamation or renunciation”
any religion.253 The language of the new Article 64 similarly guarantees freedom of
belief and “freedom to practice religious rites”; therefore, it should be interpreted in
the same manner.254 As the preamble of the new Constitution states that the SCC’s
decisions on matters of Sharia are to be considered the official interpretations of
such issues, the SCC’s 1996 interpretation should thus be enshrined as the official
interpretation of this specific provision.
Such an action should provide a constitutional basis (pending effective
enforcement) for solving a number of problems for minority religious groups. For
one, it would prevent the forced declaration of one’s religious affiliation on the
national ID card and, thus, the discrimination associated with the government’s
failure to recognize certain religions, such as the Baha’i faith.255 For another, it
would prevent believers of one religion from being compelled to adhere to another
religion in which they do not believe, and it could also be used to protect minorities
against anti-apostasy laws.256
B. Ensure that Institutional Structures Are Created and Continue to Enable
Effective Enforcement of Rights and to Hold State Actors Accountable
Egypt must ensure that institutional structures exist to effectuate the religious
exercise rights contained in the Constitution, lest the state continue its regulation
of, interference with, and persecution of religious minorities, and further tolerate
nonstate violence against religious minorities. Specifically, the state must provide
religious minorities with effective means of preventing rights abuses by the state—
through structural accountability—and with meaningful redress of rights violations
from the state or nonstate actors. It should do so in two ways: first, by maintaining
the judiciary as an independent branch and altering it to grant religious minorities a
presence within it; and second, by creating human rights commissions with duties
to investigate allegations of religious exercise violations, to make public reports on
their findings, and to prosecute both state and nonstate violators.

252. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
253. See supra MOUSTAFA, note 48, at 166. This case upheld the Egyptian minister of
education’s ban on the wearing of the niqab by female students, holding it constitutional
under Articles 2 and 41 of the 1971 Constitution.
254. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 64.
255. See supra Parts II.A.2.a, II.B.3.a, II.C.3.a; see also 2012 BUREAU REPORT, supra
note 21, at 6–7.
256. See supra Parts II.A.2.a, II.B.3.a, II.C.3.a.
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The judicial branch can provide an effective venue for enforcing rights of
religious exercise—indeed, the SCC has done so before257—and, likely recognizing
this, the new Constitution provides private causes of action for “[a]ny violation of
personal freedom, or the sanctity of the private life of citizens, or any other public
rights and freedoms which are guaranteed by the Constitution and the Law” to be
enforced in the courts.258 However, given the role that the judiciary has played in
enforcing restrictions of religious liberty,259 the judiciary must have two qualities in
order to provide an effective forum for the adjudication of such causes of action.
First, it must truly be an independent branch, free from majoritarian or dictatorial
influence, and given due respect by the other branches.260 Chapters Three and Four
of the Constitution establish it as such261—in particular, the SCC remains an
“independent judicial body”262 that is “solely competent to decide on the
constitutionality of laws and regulations [and] to interpret legislative
provisions”263—but these provisions must be adhered to by both the executive and
legislative branches if the opinions of the court system are to be truly effective.
The second quality that the judiciary must have is that its members must be
chosen in such a way as to include religious minorities. Article 186 now states that
the “conditions and procedures for [judicial] appointment[s] . . . shall be regulated
by law,”264 and Article 193 seems to indicate that the SCC is composed of
presidential appointees.265 Further language should be added to these chapters—or,
at the very least, to the regulations of the judiciary—that would explicitly include
the governing authorities of each religious minority in the nomination process, and
would reserve a portion of the SCC’s seats for religious minorities. This would help
to ensure the inclusion of minority voices in both the composition of the court and
the selection process.
Further, the human rights commissions addressed in the new Constitution—a
commission for the elimination of discrimination and a national council on human

257. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Brown, supra note 24, at 1083–
86.
258. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 99.
259. See 7 Egyptian Christians, Florida Pastor Sentenced to Death for Anti-Islam Film,
FOX NEWS, Nov. 28, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/28/seven-egyptian
-christians-sentenced-to-death-for-anti-islam-film/.
260. Independent judicial branches have long proven effective guardians of individual
rights. See, e.g., Neal R. Sonnett, Chair’s Column, HUM. RTS., Winter 2009, at 2, 2
(commenting that the United States “depends on an independent and impartial judiciary . . .
for the protection of our most precious individual rights and liberties); Maureen Callahan
VanderMay, The Role of the Judiciary in India’s Constitutional Democracy, 20 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 103, 104 (1996) (noting that “[t]he Indian Supreme Court . . .
conceives of the Indian Judiciary as . . . the protector of individual liberties against political
branch aggression”). Accordingly, they ought feature prominently in a rebuilding nation’s
constitution in order to protect individual rights. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Postconflict
Justice in Iraq, HUM. RTS., Winter 2006, at 15, 15–16.
261. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, arts. 184–195.
262. Id. art. 191.
263. Id. art. 192.
264. Id. art. 186.
265. Id. art. 193.
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rights266—must be established and empowered to investigate (on their own or on
request by aggrieved parties), report, prosecute, and intervene in cases involving
violations of religious exercise rights committed by state or nonstate actors.267
These commissions must truly be given the autonomy over their affairs and
budgets that Article 214 commands,268 and they must be comprised of individuals
selected with the input of the leadership of the various religious minorities in order
to ensure that they remain independent from majoritarian forces. These bodies can
provide a special investigative and prosecutorial force aimed at enforcing the
country’s religious exercise provisions by policing the affairs of the state—helping
to ensure effective prevention and redress of impermissible state regulations,
activities, and failures to protect religious minorities—and the acts of nonstate
actors.269
C. Ensure that the Constitution’s Horizontal Rights Provisions Are Enforced
Egypt must ensure that the horizontal rights created in its new Constitution—
namely, Article 53’s right to be free from discrimination270 and Article 99’s right to
enjoy the “personal freedom, . . . sanctity of the private life of citizens, [and] any
other public rights and freedoms which are guaranteed by the Constitution and the
Law”271—are enforced in order to both prevent acts of violence and provide
effective penalties for such acts committed by nonstate actors against adherents of
religious minorities.272 By providing a Constitutional cause of action for aggrieved
religious minorities, horizontally applicable rights provide greater force for
religious minorities in demanding justice from the state, and they ought to be used
to implement heavy punishments against violators.

266. See id. arts. 53, 99, 214. For background information on the origins and original
duties of the National Council for Human Rights, see The Establishment, NAT’L COUNCIL
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.nchregypt.org/index.php/en/about-us/establishment.html;
Vision & Goals, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.nchregypt.org/index.php
/en/about-us/visions-and-goals.html.
267. A number of other nations have similar commissions, such as Burma, see Burma
Sets Up Human Rights Commission, BBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2011, 12:26 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14807362, Mongolia, see About the
Commission, NAT’L HUM. RTS. COMMISSION OF MONG., http://www.mn-nhrc.org/eng/main/1,
and South Korea, see About the Commission, NAT’L HUM. RTS. COMMISSION OF KOR.,
http://www.humanrights.go.kr/english/about_commission/introduction.jsp.
268. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 214.
269. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has recommended that a
body similar to this be created within the Office of the Public Prosecutor. 2012 REPORT,
supra note 86, at 66.
270. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 53.
271. See id. art. 99.
272. For an excellent explanation of horizontal rights, see generally Stephen Gardbaum,
The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387 (2003).
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D. Enforce International Human Rights Conventions in Domestic Courts
Egypt should enforce the international human rights conventions to which it is a
signatory in its domestic courts. Indeed, Article 93 of the new Constitution provides
that “[t]he State shall be bound by the international human rights agreements,
covenants and conventions ratified by Egypt,” and that these “shall have the force of
law.”273 Egypt is a signatory to a number of international human rights conventions
guaranteeing rights of religious exercise, including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).274 If these are to have the “force of law,” they must actually be enforced and
adjudicated by the judiciary.
Providing for the enforcement of these provisions in domestic courts would further
protect religious minorities in the exercise of their religious beliefs by giving them
additional enforceable rights that carry with them international overtones. These
conventions would open the door for the entry of international legal doctrines
regarding religious exercise and represent a way that religious freedom in Egypt could
expand to protect minority religions not recognized by Islam and to include religious
conduct not tolerated by Islamic law, such as freedom to proselytize and to convert.
E. Remove Limitations from Current Religious Freedom Provisions
Egypt should remove the language that restricts the religious exercise rights
established by Article 64 of the new Constitution, removing reference both to specific
religions and to further “regulat[ion] by law.”275 Regarding the former, the language
limiting that article’s guarantee of the “freedom of practicing religious rituals and
establishing worship places for the followers of Abrahamic religious” (meaning
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) should be stricken so that all minority religions in
Egypt (Baha’is, Shi’a, etc.), not merely those who meet this favored classification,

273. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 93.
274. The most relevant provision of the UDHR is Article 18, which states that
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.” United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 18,
Dec. 10, 1948.
The most relevant provisions of the ICCPR provides as follows: “the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion[,] . . . includ[ing] [the] freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching,” United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Art. 18, Sect. 1, Dec. 16, 1966; the right to “manifest one's religion or beliefs . . . subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others,” id. at Art. 18,
Sect. 3; the right of religious minorities “in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise [sic] their own religion, or to use
their own language,” id. at Art. 27; the right to be free from coercion impairing “freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief,” id. at Art. 18, Sect. 2.
275. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 64.
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might claim this protection as their own.276 The removal of this phrase would allow
Article 64 to be applied as broadly as Egyptian courts will be willing to interpret it—
that is, though this language at this time still likely will be viewed through the lens of
Islamic teachings (i.e., it will be read to apply only to recognized religions), it could
apply to all religions if and when the state is willing to apply it thus.277
Regarding the latter, the language at the end of Article 64, subjugating its
guarantees to further “regulat[ion] by law,” should be removed so that its guarantees
are not subject to restriction, revision, or reinterpretation by mere statute, but are
instead elevated to a more truly “absolute” status subject only to the provisions of the
Constitution itself.278 This should accomplish two protections of minority religions:
formally, this would elevate from second-tier status the right to freedom of belief,
practice, and places of worship, placing this right above the reach of Islamist
majorities in parliament, who otherwise could limit it by a simple majority vote;
practically, this should solve the problem created by the 1856 requirement that the
executive branch approve construction or maintenance of houses of worship, by
granting an explicit right to establish places of worship.279
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing attests, the situation for religious minorities in post-Arab Spring
Egypt is a tenuous one. Though the January 25 Revolution, birthed out of a struggle
for greater rights and liberties, gave hope for freer religious exercise by minority
religions, the same struggles and restrictions remain, and, given the increased religious
tensions in the aftermath of the June 30 Revolution, they unfortunately threaten to
increase. The oppressors of former days and regimes are gone, but new oppressors
cyclically arise in their stead, and restrictions of minority religious exercise continue.
With tensions running high, and with two revolutions in the span of three years, Egypt
cannot afford to allow these problems to languish. The government must act decisively
in the present if its religious minorities are to have a future in the country—a future for
which they have given much in the Arab Spring revolutions.
This Note argues that the most serious and meaningful step that Egyptians can take
is to create strong constitutional protections and an effective framework for exercising
those protections, and it recommends five specific individual rights-based reforms that
should be undertaken in order to right the wrongs of the current system. Perhaps, if
these are followed, adherents of Egypt’s religious minorities may finally be able to
exercise their beliefs more freely, and the revolutions will, for them, have not been in
vain.

276. Id.
277. Note, it was the understanding of Egyptian officials interviewed for the 2013 report
that Article 43 already guarantees this freedom to unrecognized religions, though they would
be required to prove this assertion in court. See 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 50. With the
removal of such restrictive language, Article 47 would require Egyptian courts to protect the
religious exercise rights of all minorities. The state may recognize and apply Article 64 as
such even at this time, given the “cavernous political divide” and accompanying conflicting
constitutional interpretations that persist. See Al-Ali & Brown, supra note 120.
278. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 64.
279. See supra Part I.A.

